In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Anthropological Perspectives in Psychiatric NosologyJuan J. López-Ibor Jr. (bio) and María-Inés López-Ibor (bio)KeywordsDSM, etiology, Aristotelian causes, social dramasPsychiatry and clinical psychology, as we learn in this paper, are disciplines in need of an ontological perspective. Very few branches of contemporary learning share this characteristic. Probably only theoretical physic and theology—as the rest have long ago given up trying to define and understand the essence of their object, (...) for example, life in the case of biology or mind in psychology. Consequently, the paper by Pérez-Álvarez, Sass and García-Montes, “The Ontology of Mental Disorders in Constructivist Perspective,” (2008) should be welcomed and indeed included in the reading lists for trainees in psychiatry and clinical psychology.The authors propose an approach to the understanding of mental disorders that is extremely attractive and well articulated, and which also has practical implications for clinicians. It is not just another “philosophical divertimento” devoid of scientific and practical importance. Let us analyze the article in an orderly way.Less DsmThe authors of the target paper disapprove of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)-III/IV approach to defining illnesses by starting from the symptoms that are present—on the grounds that this may lead clinicians to assume that their sole role is to identify, fight, and suppress the symptoms by whichever procedure. They propose an alternative that is dear to myself because it follows the path of the so-called “anthropological” psychiatry of Binswanger, von Gebsattel, Erwin Strauss, Zutt, López-Ibor, Sr., and others. In essence, this is a phenomenological approach to the meaning of mental diseases, one that emphasizes how the illness is revealed to the patient him- or herself.The target article’s criticism of DSM should be considered in the context of the abuses committed on its behalf. The DSM is not a textbook of psychiatric disorders, nor does it contain a definition of the diseases. The DSM does not tell what a disease is (Klerman et al. 1984)—something that is impossible with a classification system based on the manifestations of the diseases, the signs and symptoms. The DSM, as its title states, is just a diagnostic and statistical manual, which does not contain anything about the origin of [End Page 259] any disease nor an explanation of why it exists or what it means. The DSM is, in fact, just a tool to determine whether a disease is present, and therefore to facilitate communication between professionals and with other individuals, without saying anything about the disease’s aitia—a key term (associated with notions of essence as well as cause) to be discussed below. In theory, most clinicians should understand these limitations; it may be, however, that this is not really the case for many who read or use the DSM. In the world there are around 200,000 psychiatrists; since 1980 the number of DSM copies sold is in the order of several hundred thousand.The misuse of a classification system is even more noticeable in the International Classification of Diseases (ICD)-10 Research Version. The instructions for the use of this version recommend that the first step is to make an inventory of all the symptoms present, and then to construct a diagnosis based on them. This how all computer-assisted systems work. This procedure can, however, only be valid if the clinician has already reached a diagnostic conclusion by other means—a diagnosis then to be confirmed for research purposes. It may be that this is one of the reasons why the ICD-10 Research Version has almost never actually been used for research.Furthermore, the concept of symptoms in psychiatry applies only to organic mental disorders (Schneider 1959), conditions in which the patient’s attitude and way of experiencing the symptoms do not play the kind of role that they play in schizophrenia and other mental disorders. The quotation from the important paper by Sass and Parnas in this context is most appropriate. It is indeed that case that “subjective experience can play an important causal role in the progressive experiential transformations of a developing schizophrenic illness... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Creativity Belongs to the Person, not to DiseaseJuan J. López-Ibor Jr. (bio) and María-Inés López-Ibor (bio)Keywordscreativity, patho-biography, Saint Teresa, visionsIn the paper, “From the Visions of Saint Teresa of Jesus to the Voices of Schizophrenia,” Cangas, Sass, and Pérez-Álvarez (2008) take an original approach to patho-biography that is very welcome.The temptation to designate historical individuals or characters of fiction as suffering from mental disease has always produced (...) disagreeable feelings in me. This sort of abuse of psychiatry and of the people in question is parallel to the abuse by the media or lay citizens when they describe, say, an especially violent murderer as a schizophrenic—forgetting that the vast majority of people with schizophrenia are not in the least violent. Having read Santa Teresa’s writings during my adolescence, well before I even considered entering medicine, I reacted to comments about her alleged psychiatric illnesses with uneasiness, to put it mildly. The Santa Teresa of La Vida de la Santa Madre Teresa de Jesús (her autobiography), of the Camino de Perfección, and of the El Castillo Interior was surely not a mental patient, it seemed to me. The same would apply to San Juan de La Cruz, Jean D’Arc, Don Quijote, Sancho Panza, Edipus, and Clitemnestra, to mention a few. Even van Gogh’s paintings did not seem to me the productions of a patient with schizophrenia or epilepsy. Of course all of them may have suffered, at certain periods of life, symptoms attributable to a mental disorder, but their creativity rested elsewhere, and was often manifest during healthy periods of their lives. After years spent fighting the stigma of mental diseases, and after organizing several exhibitions of works of art of people with mental diseases, we came to the conclusion that creativity and singularity belong to the person, not to the illness. Some of the diseases of these individuals may have being accidents (van Gogh’s hallucinations and psychotic symptoms, for example, were most probably due to intoxications with absinthe, then rich in hallucinogenic alkaloids such as tujone), or, together with other life circumstances, may have had unspecific influences on the person’s condition. In contrast with many other psychiatric disorders that are represented in ancient Greek and Roman literature, there are no descriptions of individuals with schizophrenia in the Greek and Roman literature dating from the fifth century bc to the beginning of the second century Ad (Evans et al. 2003), and several authors have speculated that schizophrenia did not exist before the eighteenth century (Ellard 1987).Caution is important when dealing with mental health and religious issues in contrast with creativity. The creativity of people suffering from bipolar disorders is well recognized (Jamison 1993) and [End Page 277] the same applies to alcohol and drug intoxication. Tellenbach (1986) has also written on the creativity of depressed persons, although he refers more to the disposition of mood (Schwermut) than to clinical depression as such. The link between melancholia and genius put forward by Aristotle has often been misinterpreted. The philosopher was considering the melancholic temperament and not the melancholic illness as we would understand it today. Of the four temperaments, it is in his view only the melancholic that is gifted with creativity. The sanguine person seeks the immediate pleasures of life, the choleric one considers himself powerful and dedicates himself to manifesting this power, and the phlegmatic individual is disconnected from life and seeks to live without effort or pleasure. The melancholic temperament leads to creativity because of the predominance of doubt, reflection, and dissatisfaction with the miseries of life.Freud’s notion of religiosity as a collective obsessive neurosis is totally mistaken, in my view. The three main themes of obsessions are cleanliness, order, and guilt. In none of these cases is the theme the goal of the action; rather, it is a strategy to contain anxiety. As a consequence, patients with obsessions and compulsions about dirt and cleanliness tend to be dirty themselves, because the real purpose of their compulsions is not in fact to be clean but rather to satisfy a ritual. When order... (shrink)

This paper examines the prospects for global order in an environment of globalization. It analyzes the current practice in which globalization crystallizes in the universalization of Western cultural values, and identifies in this practice, a major source of all the conflicts currently plaguing the contemporary world. It argues that acts of terrorism and other similar acts are reactions to the perceived injustices of the present globalization phenomenon. This paper studies these crises because of their cultural underpinnings.Drawing on the postmodernist philosophy, (...) which not only rejects a single over-arching scheme by which all societies could be judged and advocates a thoroughgoing cultural pluralism in which alternative cultures are free to plot their own future courses, the essay believes that acts of terrorism, like similar other reactions to the present conception of global reality, can be mitigated if efforts are directed at understanding, appreciating, and respecting the traditions and cultural values of distinct societies, rather than submerging them under one dominant culture. (shrink)

This essay examines Maduabuchi Dukor’s perspective on the African conception of man, personal identity and“life-here-after”. This is with a view to showing that although, Dukor’s views represent what obtain among some ethnic nationalities in Africa, this nevertheless does not provide a basis for generalising across the whole of Africa, as there are countless number of ethnic groups in Africa to which Dukor’s general claims may not be applicable. Given the varieties of metaphysical conceptions of man and destiny in Africa which (...) we are yet to fully explore, and given also the inherent contradictions in some of these conceptions, which calls into questioning, the veracity of claims made therein, it will amount to a major logical error to make sweeping generalisations that would be representative of the whole of Africa. Such generalisations would remain a non-holistic, but partial representation of the African conception of man and human destiny. (shrink)

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz presents the idea of monads, as non-communicative, self-actuating system of beings that are windowless, closed, eternal, deterministic and individualistic. For him, the whole universe and its constituents are monads and that includes humans. In fact, any ‘body’, such as the ‘body’ of an animal or man has, according to Leibniz, one dominant monad which controls the others within it. This dominant monad, he often refers to as the soul. If Leibniz’s conception of monads is accepted, it merely (...) establishes human subjectivity, idiosyncrasies, biases, prejudices and individual points of view as the norm. How then do we ensure inter-subjectivity and the kind of social interaction requisite for the achievement of social order, since Leibniz’s system forecloses the possibility of interaction and communication among monads? In this essay, we argue that just as Leibniz’s monads synchronize only through the Supreme Monad (Monas Monadum), humans as social monads should also interact through a matrix of ideals like truth, honesty, sincerity, integrity, altruism, impartiality, compassion and trust. Since social order is actualised only within the context of linked social structures, relations and values, these utopian ideals would form the fulcrum through which humans relate and the very foundation that would anchor a viable social order. Our aim here is to establish a relationship between Leibniz’s metaphysics and the physical domains of life by showing that metaphysical constructs can impinge on human social relations and wellbeing. The study employed the qualitative method of research through critical analysis of texts, library and archival materials. (shrink)

Study of Śrībhāṣya of Rāmānuja, 1017-1137, commentary on Brahmasūtra of Bādarāyaṇa, aphoristic work on Vedanta philosophy.

Francis Offor’s claim that terrorism is a product of globalization, a process described as an unjust imposition of “Western” values, such as industrialization and literacy, on other cultural values is rejected by this paper as mistaken, too simplistic, and begging the question. These “Western” values are more correctly described as secondary human values that could universally facilitate the attainment of primary human values, such as peace and social justice, if properly applied in society. An adequate understanding of terrorism, a (...) complex phenomenon, requires a consideration of mutually reinforcing political, economic, cultural, and religious factors that underpin it. (shrink)

-- -- ḥeleḳ 3. Shaʻar ha-teḥinah -- ḥeleḳ 4. Shaʻar ha-segulot.

El proyecto mexicano de educación profesional antropológica tuvo un proceso formativo crucial a finales del gobierno posrevolucionario presidido por Lázaro Cárdenas del Río (1934-1940), pues estaba enmarcado por el programa político denominado Educación Socialista. Dicho programa dio cobijo a la fundación del Instituto Politécnico Nacional que tuvo en sus inicios un Departamento de Antropología, el cual fue transferido al Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia (INAH) en 1942, recibiendo el nombre de Escuela Nacional de Antropología (ENA). Aunque estos movimientos (...) institucionales parecieran solo reacomodos administrativos, dentro de ellos se modelaron interesantes perspectivas de trabajo antropológico e histórico, las cuales posicionaron a sus estudiantes en puestos clave de instituciones científicas, artísticas y gubernamentales que resultan elementales para la comprensión de las inquietudes y debates de la academia americana en las disciplinas antropo-históricas para las décadas venideras. Bajo tal contexto, este artículo identifica la potencialidad del proceso de formación académica y científica en la ENA a través de indicios contenidos en la documentación docente de Robert H. Barlow, profesor viajero estadounidense que, después de ser estudiante temporal, laboró en esta escuela entre 1945 y 1951. Consideramos sus registros como parte de un archivo vital, disperso en varias instituciones, que nos permiten rastrear algunos detalles sobre las personas que se encontraron en sus aulas durante este proceso de formación institucional de la ENA, contextualizándoles dentro del proyecto estatal de la profesionalización disciplinar, pero también en los inquietantes silencios que rodean las dispersas memorias andantes de este profesor migrante. (shrink)

De acuerdo a la noción de para-sí y su relación con el otro, desarrollaré un análisis del cuento Eróstrato, a la luz de ciertos conceptos sartreanos. La tesis a defender es la siguiente: la violencia originada en el conflicto sólo tiene sentido desde un hombre hacia otro hombre, donde el deseo, como conciencia intencional, es fundamental.

Being and value, by J. Zaragüeta y Bengoechea.--The origin of man, by X. Zubiri.--Negation, by J. Gaos.--The juridical notion of the human person and the rights of man, by L. Legaz y Lacambra.--History and truth, E. Nicol.--Vital anxiety, by J. J. López Ibor.--The moralization of power through its self--imitation, by J. L. Aranguren.--The doctor-patient relationship in the general framework of interhuman relationships, by P. Laín Entralgo.--On the singular character of the historical destiny of Europe, by L. Díez del Corral.--On (...) taking things for granted, by J. Ferrater Mora.--The idea of metaphysics, by J. Marías. (shrink)

Ribā/interest is one of the prominent regulations in Islam regarding commercial life. The commercial lives of Muslims and laws related to commerce were regulated in accordance with the prohibition of ribā, and by this a society that avoided ribā with sensitivity was created in practice. This sensitivity about ribā manifested in the principle that the suspicion of ribā is evaluated as ribā, and it is ruled as haram like riba. In fiqh sources, besides issues regarding ribā, issues involving suspicion of (...) ribā were also mentioned, and some rulings were justified with the presence of suspicion of riba. However, the logic of using the concept of ribā suspicion in fiqh sources may vary from case to case: the reasoning behind the use of riba suspicion in one case may not fit into another case, and thus a completely different reasoning of ribā suspicion may appear in another case. To clarify the framework of the concept of ribā suspicion, it would be noteworthy to study these each of the uses in the classical fiqh sources. The purpose of this article is to examine the use of the concept of ribā suspicion based on the cases in the Ḥanafī sources. Methodologically, first, the cases in which the concept of ribā suspicion is used are determined. Secondly, the reasoning made for each example is examined by considering the contextual framework of the case. Lastly, these uses are classified and presented to the reader with examples. The principle of evaluating “the suspicion of ribā like ribā” in Islamic law is indeed related to the rule of considering “any suspicion as certainty when it comes to harams or in matters where precaution is substantial”. Since ribā is a haram that Muslims should meticulously avoid, and therefore requires caution, its suspicion is subject to the same rulings as ribā itself. In the Hanafi fiqh books, the concept of suspicion of ribā is mostly referred in the following cases: - Not knowing whether there is equality between the subject matters in barter transactions where equality is stipulated. For example, when exchanging two batches of the same kind of ribawi goods, though quantities are unknown. - It is not known whether tariq al-itibār has taken place in changes that may be permissible through tariq al-itibār. For example, in the exchange of a silver-embroidered sword with silver, if the amount of silver in the ornamented part is not known, the suspicion of ribā arises. - The emergence of a situation similar to ribā because of a transaction that is normally permissible: While there are two legitimate sales in Bay' al-inah, the conclusion of being the same as an interest bearing loan is considered as ribā suspicion. - When the case has two different sides; from one side the act is ribā, but from other side it is not. For example, in the case of salam contract of ribawi goods, if goods of different quality are brought during delivery and the quality difference is requested from the customer; suspicion of ribā arises. Apart from these uses in the Hanafi fiqh books, it is seen that the concept of ribā suspicion is employed to prove an opinion disputed between schools of Islamic law. For example, to argue that ribā rules are also valid for goods sold by piece (adadiyyāt) or by length measures (zirāiyyāt), the Hanafis say that one of the two causes (illah) of ribā is found in the exchange of these goods by type, and the suspicion of ribā arises with just a single cause (illah). On the other hand, the Shafiis use the concept of suspicion of ribā to argue that determining the subjects (ta’yin) in the exchange of ribavi goods other than gold and silver is not sufficient. Another use of the term emerges because of the authors' preference for a cautious language. Some authors acted cautiously on some cases that were normally ribā and were described by other authors in this manner, and used the term "ribā suspicion" instead of ribā; probably as they both require the same ruling (harām). Another wrongly used (in our opinion) is the use of “suspicion of ribā” in some cases that are actually considered only as disliked acts (makruh). (shrink)

[ḥeleḳ 1]. Al hilkhot meḳaḥ ṭaʻut, onaʼah u-matanah, Ḥ m. 227-249 -- ḥeleḳ 2. ʻAl Hilkhot avedah u-metsiʼah, hefḳer, periḳah u-ṭeʻinah, genevah u-gezelah, Ḥ. m. 259-275, 348-377.

[1] Shaʻar ʻavodat ha-Eloḳim -- [2] Shaʻar ha-beḥinah. Shaʻar Yiḥud ha-maʻaśeh -- [3] Shaʻar ha-biṭaḥon 1-2.